49ers film room: Why the 49ers run game struggled in Super Bowl 58 and did Kyle Shanahan have a game management problem?

A look back at why some of the third quarter play calling was pass heavy in the Super Bowl.

Author’s note: This article sat in my drafts for a long time. For a while after the Super Bowl I was just physically and mentally exhausted from work and life and enjoying the snow in the mountains with my 10 year old son and good friends and didn’t really have the energy or desire to write for a few weeks. The break was much needed but now I am back trying to do this regularly. I didn’t want to let this linger after thinking about the game we probably all want to forget as well. But I feel these things are important to address as we gear up for the 2024 season.

The 49ers run game virtually disappeared in Super Bowl 58. No, head coach Kyle Shanahan did not abandon the run as is the common trope in these losses. Instead, the offense had 28 rushing attempts for 98 yards, a paltry 3.5 yards per carry, in their 25-22 loss to the Chiefs. According to Pro Football Reference, the 49ers rushed for 66 yards on 15 carries over the left side. On runs over the right side: 9 carries for 27 yards, a full 1.5 yards average less than runs to the left.

On offense, the 49ers offensive line made a ton of mistakes in blocking up the run game where often just one player can be the weak link on a given play with blown blocks. And this includes everyone on the offensive line, including Trent Williams.

The Chiefs deserve a ton of credit for this too. Defensive coordinator Steve Spagnuolo adjusted after the first drive after seeing the 49ers personnel packages and borrowed heavily from the Patriots 2018 game plan versus the Rams in the Super Bowl to slow down a predominantly zone running team.

After giving up 17 yards to the 49ers run game on their first two run plays, the Chiefs defense committed to a 5-down odd front defense and a 6-1 front on running downs to slow down Christian McCaffrey and the run game. These are fronts that the 49ers under Shanahan in recent seasons have traditionally struggled against. Zone running scheme teams rely on combo blocks and getting to the second level to block linebackers and the 5-2/5-3/6-1 fronts prevent that from happening.

5-2 and 5-3 defensive fronts

Facing a 5-man odd defensive front at the last second before the snap caused some confusion along the 49ers offensive line. The gamble by Steve Spagnuolo paid off. The 49ers blocking schemes were discombobulated in the run game for most of the rest of the game.

On McCaffrey’s fumble, linebacker Leo Chenal rotated down to the line of scrimmage while the defensive end bumped outside and the defensive tackle bumped inside. This changed the blocking assignments at the last second and it looked like Brendel would be working a combo block with Feliciano but instead he had to combo block with Aaron Banks on Mike Pennel, who jumped inside.

Feliciano was left 1-on-1 with a linebacker, a match he should theoretically win but didn’t. Chenal shoved him into the backfield and forced McCaffrey to shift his track inside to the teeth of the defense. Feliciano couldn’t secure the block by getting his head to the outside of Chenal and the play was lost instantly. Chenal eventually forced the fumble here, keeping the 49ers off the board on an otherwise promising drive.

6-1 front 

The 6-1 front functions similarly to the 5-2 and 5-3 fronts above, by limiting the offensive line’s ability to execute combo blocks and climb to the linebackers. The Chiefs are in a 4-2 pre-snap before the 49ers shift.

After the 49ers shifted, the Chiefs walked their linebackers up to the line of scrimmage to create a 6-1 front with Justin Reid as the middle linebacker.

The front change at the last second messed with the blocking scheme of the 49ers running a zone running concept to their right. McKivitz stepped laterally to his right to block the 5-technique defensive end as he slants inside of McKivitz.

Jon Feliciano combo blocked to his inside with the center, but with the way McKivitz stepped to block the defensive end, it’s more likely that he should have helped block the end with McKivitz. McCaffrey was tackled for a 4-yard loss.

The 49ers run game struggles likely influenced Shananan’s decision to go pass heavy in the early third quarter offensive drives. And every drive to start the third quarter was ended with a punt. An examination of those plays shows that the problem wasn’t the play call, it was the execution. The yards were there to be had. The lack of execution did not allow it.

Kyle Shanahan’s 3rd quarter decision making and player execution

A subject of contention that seems to cause a lot of consternation and debate is the subject of Kyle Shanahan’s game management, specifically in the 3rd quarter of the Super Bowl. Scroll Twitter/X at any given time and you’ll likely run into tweets from other content creators and fans calling into question Shanahan’s decision to throw the ball on 8 of the first 9 third quarter plays. But it’s not that simple when looking at the play calls themselves and the situations they were in.

At the start of the third quarter, the offense was unable to score after recording three straight three-and-outs to start the half, with their first drive starting at mid field after intercepting Patrick Mahomes.

The first play after the interception was a shot play on a play action concept called “burner.” This play action pass protection cost the 49ers at least two plays in this game, the other being the famous 3rd-and-4 in overtime. The culprit on this play is Aaron Banks, who blocked down inside and let the blitzing linebacker through.

I mentioned this on X (twitter) and former offensive lineman Geoff Schawartz quote tweeted me saying I was wrong because there was no way they’d slide away from Chris Jones. But Jones slants inside, giving the down blocking guard an easier block to execute. If Aaron Banks would have fanned out to his left, he would have picked up the blitzing linebacker as they had all the rushers accounted for along the front.

In addition to this, we know Banks is wrong because every other linemen is stepping down to their left. Had Purdy not had the free rusher in his face, he might have hit Kittle who was open with a step on the defender or he could have checked down for some decent yardage.

On the next play, a 2nd and 10, and one in which there’s a 60/40 split in favor of passing versus running on 2nd and 10 specifically, the 49ers actually called a run play but were flagged for a false start.

We can tell what kind of play they called based on Aaron Banks false start movement. It was a called run. Banks stepped down inside with his right foot, a movement a lineman would normally make on a run play and indicating Shanahan’s intent was not to call all pass plays. But being in 2nd and 15, the 49ers had to pass now.

On 2nd and 15, Purdy missed Deebo on a shallow throw over the middle from a clean pocket, a throw they have to make. If he can hit Deebo in stride, it sets up a manageable 3rd down.

Brock’s accuracy and velocity decline significantly when the pocket gets “tall.” The later into the down Purdy gets, the more he has a tendency to rush his throws and have some errant misses. This happened a few times in this game, nothing egregious that cost them by any means, but this was an issue on two of the three 3rd quarter drives.

Purdy bailed on a clean pocket on 3rd and 15 on the next play.

It’s unlikely they get the first down but Aiyuk is wide open and Jennings is open on the crossing route. The pocket is clean and there’s no reason to not dump the ball off and see what kind of yards your playmakers can get. Instead, he forced himself to scramble and can’t outrun the linebacker to the sideline.

Verdict: Early down player execution killed this drive, not play calling.

On the second drive, it was more of the same with player execution stalling the drive. Let’s look at the specific play selection on this drive.

On the first play, the 49ers went under center from their own 35 yard line and attempted to hit an explosive pass play off play action on their “Leak” concept. The leak route is run by Juszczyk who’s lined up inside on the line of the tight end on the scrimmage.

Chris Jones is lined up over Colton McKivitz here. The goal of play action is to make the run fake look the same as a run play. What that means for McKivitz is to sell the run by getting his head to the inside of Jones and getting Jones to move horizontally. Instead, McKivitz loses his leverage, his head stays outside of Jones, and Jones sheds the blocker and gets up field in pursuit of Purdy.

Purdy sets up to throw but Jones in his face so Purdy must pull out a magic trick and get the ball out before he takes a big loss. They still took an 8-yard loss because of McKivitz poor pass block. If Purdy had time to throw, he might have hit Juszczyk for a big gain across the 50. Instead, they went into second down needing 18 yards for a first.

Now they’re in a straight passing situation. On 2nd-and-18, Purdy looked for Deebo on a shallow crosser to see if they could get yards and set up a manageable third down. But Deebo, who struggled all game versus L’Jarius Sneed, was unable to get open, forcing Purdy down his third read in a collapsing pocket. They picked up 7, but it wasn’t enough.

Now on 3rd and 11, they have to pass. And Shanahan found a match-up that should have been easy to take advantage of.

Here, Deebo does get wide open, but Purdy doesn’t even go to that side. He sees his tight end, George Kittle, matched-up with the Chiefs backup safety. Purdy 100% picks the right side to throw to here but Kittle can’t locate the ball. For some reason, Kittle looks back for the ball instead of up in the air.

Purdy puts the ball outside away from the leverage but Kittle never spots it instead thinking the ball was going to be more on his back shoulder but that isn’t the right place to throw it.

Verdict: Player execution killed this drive too. The tone was set on first down with an 8 yard loss that otherwise might have been an explosive pass play.

On the next third quarter drive, the 49ers got the ball back after only surrendering a field goal. It was 10-6 in favor of the 49ers at this point. And when they did run the ball, it was a disaster.

On 1st and 10 here, the 49ers go under center and get into a reduced formation in 21 personnel (2 running backs, 1 tight end) and running misdirection inside zone. Chiefs defensive tackle Mike Pennel absolutely stonewalls Trent Williams’ block attempt, sheds him, and tackles McCaffrey for no gain.

We never see this happen to Williams. And yet, it happened here and it happened on a pretty important drive while leading by four points and it was a reminder of why Shanahan shifted the game plan in the third quarter to a more pass-centric offense on early downs.

Now it’s 2nd and 10 and the offense needs to get yards. Running the ball won’t cut it here. They almost have to pass to get yardage back.

Purdy misfires this ball after making the wrong read. The ball should go to Deebo on the “now” slant underneath since the corner bailed and didn’t challenge him. Instead, Purdy, thinking he had Aiyuk for a first down, double pumped, and sailed a pass out of bounds because he was late throwing it. He might have had Aiyuk had he not hesitated to throw the out route but his wasted movement allowed the defender to recover and force a throw into tight coverage.

The biggest gripe I had with Shanahan in this game was running the passing game through Deebo instead of Aiyuk but that was never really a criticism that was levied against him. And this third down play is a perfect example of why that didn’t work.

The play call is a 3x1 dagger concept that isn’t an ideal play call against this coverage because of the risk that the dagger route receiver can’t win 1-on-1. The deep seam route is not an option versus two deep safeties because the route is capped over the top and underneath.

Aiyuk on the backside is actually open on his dig route away from trips but he isn’t even in the primary progression as the alert route receiver. Two deep safeties eliminates the alert route here as an option. Could Purdy have given him a chance? Maybe. But they installed this play thinking Deebo would be a better option over the middle of the field.

Verdict: 90% player execution and 10% play calling. The play calling aspect was more about the game plan and strategy behind making Deebo the primary receiver in the biggest game of the year and not Aiyuk. Perhaps they thought Aiyuk would be doubled. But he wasn’t and he won the majority of his reps.

But it’s easy to question after the fact. Shanahan stated:

"There’s nothing that I thought in the moment that I did wrong. I was proud of that. I liked the thought process behind everything."

I don’t necessarily disagree with that sentiment. In the moment, he thought he was making the right decisions. I would have liked to see him go for a couple of 4th down conversions late in the game but these are all decisions he has to make on the fly that are influenced by other factors.

They’re only wrong if the end result is wrong and at that point the defense was getting stops and getting off the field. It would be far worse to have a coach second-guessing himself in the moment instead of making hard concrete decisions.